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Abstract
We continue the study of asynchrony immunity in cellular automata (CA),
which can be considered as a generalization of correlation immunity in the
case of vectorial Boolean functions. The property could have applications as
a countermeasure for side-channel attacks in CA-based cryptographic prim-
itives, such as S-boxes and pseudorandom number generators. We first give
some theoretical results on the properties that a CA rule must satisfy in order
to meet asynchrony immunity, like central permutivity. Next, we perform an
exhaustive search of all asynchrony immune CA rules of neighborhood size
up to 5, leveraging on the discovered theoretical properties to greatly reduce
the size of the search space.
Keywords cellular automata, cryptography, asynchrony immunity, correlation
immunity, nonlinearity, side-channel attacks, permutivity
1 Introduction
In the last years, research about cryptographic applications of cellular automata
(CA) focused on the properties of the underlying local rules [14, 10, 8]. In fact,
designing a CA-based cryptographic primitive using local rules that are not highly
nonlinear and correlation immune could make certain attacks more efficient.
The aim of this paper is to investigate a new property related to asynchronous
CA called asynchrony immunity (AI), which could be of interest in the context
of side-channel attacks. This property can be described by a three-move game
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between a user and an adversary. Let ℓ,r,m ∈ N, n = m+ ℓ+ r and t ≤ m. The
game works as follows:
1. The user chooses a local rule f : Fℓ+r+12 → F2 of memory ℓ and anticipation
r.
2. The adversary chooses j ≤ t cells of the CA in the range {0, · · · ,m−1}.
3. The user evaluates the output distribution D of the CA F : Fn2 → F
m
2 and the
distribution D˜ of the asynchronous CA F˜ : Fn2→ F
m
2 where the j cells selected
by the adversary are not updated.
4. Outcome: if both D and D˜ equals the uniform distribution, the user wins.
Otherwise, the adversary wins.
A cellular automaton rule f : Fℓ+r+12 → F2 is called (t,n)–asynchrony immune if,
for every subset I of at most t cells both the asynchronous CA F˜ : Fn2→ F
m
2 resulting
from not updating on the subset I of cells and the corresponding synchronous CA
F : Fn2 → F
m
2 are balanced, that is, the cardinality of the counterimage of each m-
bit configuration equals 2ℓ+r. Thus, asynchrony immune CA rules represent the
winning strategies of the user in the game described above.
Notice the difference between the asynchrony immunity game and the t-resilient
functions game [5]: in the latter, generic vectorial Boolean functions F : Fn2 → F
m
2
are considered instead of cellular automata, and the adversary selects both values
and positions of the t input variables.
The side-channel attack model motivating our work is the following. Suppose
that a CA of length n is used as an S-box in a block cipher, and that an attacker is
able to inject clock faults by making t cells not updating. If the CA is not (t,n)-AI,
then the attacker could gain some information on the internal state of the cipher
by analyzing the differences of the output distributions in the original CA and the
asynchronous CA. Similar fault attacks have already been investigated on stream
ciphers based on clock-controlled Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR), such as
LILI-128 [7]. For further information on the topic, Hoch and Shamir [9] provide
more references on clock fault attacks on stream ciphers.
This paper is an extended version of [12]. In particular, the new contribution is
twofold: from the theoretical side, we formally prove the necessity of central per-
mutivity to have asynchrony immunity, which was conjectured in [12] according
to the experimental results reported there. From the empirical point of view, we
employ this new theoretical result to consistently extend the experimental search
of asynchrony immune rules, by considering larger neighborhood sizes.
In the remainder of this paper, we recall in Section 2 the necessary basic no-
tions about Boolean functions and (asynchronous) CA, and we formally introduce
the definition of asynchrony immunity in Section 3, giving some theoretical results
regarding this property. In particular, we show that AI is invariant under the op-
erations of reflection and complement and that, for high enough values of t (the
maximum number of blocked cells), central permutivity is a necessary condition
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for asynchrony immunity. We then perform in Section 4 an exhaustive search of
asynchrony immune CA having 8 output cells and neighborhood size up to 5, com-
puting also their nonlinearity and algebraic normal form. Finally, we provide some
possible ways to generalize the notion of asynchrony immunity and how this prop-
erty can be linked to existing CA models in Section 5, as well as pointing out other
avenues for future research on the subject.
2 Basic Notions
In this section, we cover all necessary background definitions about one-dimensional
CA, Boolean functions, and vectorial Boolean functions. In particular, we refer the
reader to [2, 3] for an in-depth discussion of (vectorial) Boolean functions.
Recall that a Boolean function is a mapping f : Fn2 → F2, where F2 = {0,1}
denotes the finite field of two elements. Once an ordering of the n-bit input vectors
has been fixed, each Boolean function f can be uniquely represented by the output
column of its truth table, which is a vector Ω f of 2
n binary elements. Therefore, the
set of all possible Boolean functions of n variables, denoted by Bn, has cardinality
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n
. The interpretation of the vector Ω f as a decimal number is also called the
Wolfram code of the function f . Another common way of representing a Boolean
function is through its Algebraic Normal Form (ANF), that is, as a sum of products
over its input variables. More formally, given f : Fn2→ F2 and x∈ F
n
2, the ANF will
be of the form
Pf (x) =
⊕
I∈2[n]
aI
(
∏
i∈I
xi
)
, (1)
where [n] is the initial segment of the natural numbers determined by n ∈ N, i.e.,
[n] = {0, . . . ,n− 1}, and the set I = {i1, . . . , it} ⊆ [n] is a subset of t indices and
thus an element of 2[n], the power set of [n]. For all I ∈ 2[n] the coefficient aI ∈ F2
is determined through the Möbius transform [2]. A function f is called affine if
the only non null coefficients aI are such that |I| ≤ 1. In other words, the ANF is
composed only of monomials of degree at most 1.
Boolean functions used in the design of symmetric ciphers must satisfy a cer-
tain number of properties in order to withstand particular cryptanalytic attacks.
Two of the most important properties are balancedness and nonlinearity. A Boolean
function f : Fn2 → F2 is balanced if its output vector Ω f is composed of an equal
number of zeros and ones. Unbalanced Boolean functions produce a statistical bias
in the output of a symmetric cipher, which can be exploited by an attacker.
The nonlinearity of f , on the other hand, is the minimum Hamming distance
of Ω f from the set of all affine functions. The value of nonlinearity of f can be
computed as Nl( f ) = 2−1(2n−Wmax( f )), whereWmax( f ) is the maximum absolute
value of theWalsh transform of f [2]. The nonlinearity of a Boolean function used
in a cipher should be as high as possible, in order to thwart linear cryptanalysis
attacks. Nonetheless, there exist upper bounds on the nonlinearity achievable by
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a Boolean function with respect to the number of its input variables. In particular,
for n even it holds that Nl( f )≤ 2n−1−2
n
2
−1. Functions satisfying this bound with
equality are called bent. On the other hand, for n odd the upper bound when n≤ 7
is Nl( f ) ≤ 2n−1− 2
n−1
2 , which is achieved by quadratic functions. For n > 7, the
exact bound is still not known.
Let n,m ∈ N. A vectorial Boolean function of n input variables and m output
variables (also called an (n,m)-function) is a mapping F : Fn2→ F
m
2 . In particular, a
(n,m)-function is defined by m Boolean functions of the form fi : F
n
2 → F2, called
coordinate functions. Each 0 ≤ i < m, each fi specifies the i-th output bit of F .
That is, for each x ∈ Fn2, we have F(x)i = fi(x) for 0≤ i< m.
A one-dimensional cellular automaton (CA) can be seen as a particular case
of vectorial Boolean function by limiting the way the coordinate functions can
be defined. Let ℓ,m,r ∈ N be non-negative integers and let n = ℓ+m+ r. Let
f : Fℓ+r+12 → F2 be a Boolean function of ℓ+ r+1 variables. A cellular automaton
of length n with local rule f , memory ℓ and anticipation r is the (n,m)-function
F : Fn2 → F
m
2 defined for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} and for all x = (x−ℓ, . . . ,xm+r) ∈ F
n
2
as:
F(x−ℓ, . . . ,xm+r−1)i = f (xi−ℓ, . . . ,ci+r). (2)
Thus, a CA is the special case of a vector Boolean function where all coordinate
functions are defined uniformly.
A t-asynchronous CA, or t-ACA, induced by I is denoted by F˜I and it is defined
by the following global function F˜I : F
n
2 → F
m
2 :
F˜I(x−ℓ, . . . ,xm+r−1)i =
{
fi(xi−ℓ, . . . ,xi+r) if i < I
xi if i ∈ I.
We also recall that a local rule f : Fℓ+r+12 → F2 is said to be center permutive
when for each u ∈ Fℓ2, v ∈ F
r
2, and y ∈ F2 there exists a unique x ∈ F2 such that
f (uyv) = x. In the field F2, center permutivity can also be expressed in another way.
A local rule f : Fℓ+r2 →F2 is center permutive if there exists a function g : F
ℓ+r
2 → F2
such that for all x= (x0, . . . ,xℓ+r) ∈ F
ℓ+r+1
2 we have that:
f (x0, . . . ,xℓ+r) = xℓ⊕g(x0, . . . ,xℓ−1,xℓ+1, . . . ,xℓ+r) .
3 Definition of Asynchrony Immunity
Recall that a CA F : Fn2 → F
m
2 with n= ℓ+ r+m is said to be balanced if for each
y ∈ Fm2 , the preimages of y, i.e., all x ∈ F
n
2 such that F(x) = y, denoted by F
−1(y) is
such that |F−1(y)|= 2ℓ+r. Asynchrony immune CA can then be defined as follows:
Definition 1. Let n,m,r, ℓ, t ∈ N be non-negative integers, with n= ℓ+m+ r, and
F : Fn2 → F
m
2 a balanced CA having local rule f : F
ℓ+r+1
2 → F2.
The CA F is said to be (t,n)-asynchrony immune (for short, (t,n)-AI) if for all
sets I ⊆ [m] with |I| ≤ t the resulting |I|-ACA F˜I is balanced.
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Among all possible 22
ℓ+r+1
rules of memory ℓ and anticipation r, we are in-
terested in finding local rules that generates asynchrony immune CA satisfying
additional useful cryptographic properties, such as high nonlinearity. As a conse-
quence, proving necessary conditions for a rule to generate a (t,n)-AI is useful in
reducing the size of the search space.
We start by proving that, for large enough CA and for high enough values of t,
a necessary condition of f is central permutivity.
Theorem 1. Let F : Fn2 → F
m
2 be a (t,n)-AI CA with memory ℓ and anticipation
r. If t ≥ ℓ+ r and n ≥ 2ℓ+ 2r+ 1 then the local rule f : Fℓ+r+12 → F2 is center
permutive.
Proof. Suppose F to be (t,n)-AI with t and n as in the hypothesis. Let y= u1au2v∈
F
m
2 be a configuration with u1 ∈ F
ℓ
2, a ∈ F2, u2 ∈ F
r
2, and v ∈ F
m−ℓ−r−1
2 . Let the set
I ⊇{0, . . . , ℓ,ℓ+2, . . . ,r} be a set of indices to be blocked. It then follows that each
preimage of y can be expressed in the form x = w1u1bu2w2 with w1 ∈ F
ℓ
2, b ∈ F2,
and w2 ∈ F
m+r−ℓ−1
2 . Notice that both u1 and u2 remain unchanged when applying
F˜I to x, since their indices are all contained in I. This situation is illustrated in
Fig. 1.
Since the value of the cells in w1 cannot influence any cell in F˜I(x) (since all
cells that can be influenced are blocked), if x= w1u1bu2w2 is a preimage of y, also
x′ = w′1u1bu2w2 for every w
′
1 ∈ F
ℓ
2 is a preimage of y. Hence, the first ℓ cells of the
automaton contribute a multiplicative factor of 2ℓ for the number of preimages.
We are now going to prove that the remaining factor of 2r for the number of
preimages is entirely due to the last m+ r−1 cells (i.e., the part denoted by w2).
For the sake of argument, suppose that the multiplicative factor contributed by
the last m+ r− ℓ− 1 cells (i.e., the part denoted by w2 in the preimages) is less
than 2r, since only a single other cell in the preimage can change (the one denoted
by b), it follows that, in that case the following two configurations are preimages
of y for some choice of w2:
x= w1u10u2w2
x′ = w1u11u2w2 .
Notice that the value of a in y is either 0 or 1 and it is influenced only by its
own value and the value of u1 and u2. Without loss of generality, suppose that
a = 0. Consider now the preimages of y′ = u11u2v. To obtain 1 in the unblocked
position between u1 and u2 then, it must be f (u10u2) = 1 or f (u11u2) = 1, but by
our previous assumption, both f (u10u2) and f (u11u2) are equal to 0, and y
′ has
no preimages. Hence, our hypothesis that the part denote by w2 in the preimages
contributes less than a factor of 2r in the number or preimages is inconsistent with
the fact that F˜I must be balanced.
Therefore, the parts w1 and w2 contribute, respectively, factors 2
ℓ and 2r in the
number of preimages, for a total of 2ℓ+r preimages. It follows that, for each u1 ∈ F
ℓ
2,
u2 ∈ F
r
2, and a ∈ F2 there should be only one value b ∈ F2 such that f (u1bu2) = a.
This means that f is center permutive. 
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w1 u1 b u2 w2
u1 a u2 v
Figure 1: The construction employed by the proof of Theorem 1. The patterned
background denotes the blocked cells. Here is it is possible to see that the part
labeled with w1 cannot influence any of the output cells. The cell labeled b can
influence only the cell labeled a in the output, thus forcing the local rule to be
center permutive.
w1 u1 b u2 w2
u1 a u2 v
Fu,v
Figure 2: The construction employed by the proof of Theorem 2. The patterned
background denotes the blocked cells. For each value of u and v the function Fu,v
is a bijection from Fk2 to F
k
2 where k is the length of b.
The previous theorem can be generalized as follows:
Theorem 2. Let F : Fn2 → F
m
2 be a (t,n)-AI CA with memory ℓ and anticipation r
and k ∈ N be a non-negative integer. Then, if t ≥ ℓ+ r and n ≥ 2ℓ+ 2r+ k, the
function Fu,v : F
k
2 → F
k
2, which, for each u ∈ F
ℓ
2 and v ∈ F
r
2, is defined as Fu,v(x) =
F ′(uxv) where F ′ : Fk+ℓ+r2 → F
k
2 is a CA with the same local rule as F, is a bijection.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows the same reasoning of the proof of Theo-
rem 1. Let I be a set of indices to be blocked such that I ⊇{0, . . . , ℓ−1, ℓ+k, ℓ+k+
r}. Each element of Fm2 can then be rewritten in the form y= u1au2v with u1 ∈ F
ℓ
2,
u2 ∈ F
r
2, a ∈ F
k
2, and v ∈ F
m−ℓ−r−k
2 . Similarly, a preimage of y can be expressed
in the form x = w1u1au2w2 with w1 ∈ F
ℓ
2, w2 ∈ F
m+r−ℓ−k
2 , and a ∈ F
k
2. Following
the same reasoning of the proof of Theorem 1, it can be shown that the w1 part of
the preimage contributes a factor 2ℓ in the number of preimages and that the w2
part contributes a factor of 2r. Hence, the part denoted by b in y can have only one
preimage. Therefore, when restricted to the k cells “surrounded” by u1 and u2, the
global function of the CA is a bijection, as desired. 
Recall that the reverse of a vector x=(x0, . . . ,xn−1) is the vector x
R=(xn−1, . . . ,x0)
with all components of x appearing in reverse order. Also, the complement of x is
the vector xC = (1⊕ x0, . . . ,1⊕ xn−1) where all components of x appear negated.
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Given a local rule f : Fℓ+r+12 → F2 it is possible to define its reverse f
R : Fℓ+r+12 →
F2 as f
R(x) = f (xR) and its complement fC : Fℓ+r+12 → F2 as f
C(x) = 1⊕ f (x) for
all x ∈ Fℓ+r+12 . The definition of reverse and complement can also be extended to a
CA F : Fn2 → F
m
2 in the following way:
FR(x)i = (F(x
R)R)i = f (xi+r, . . . ,xi−ℓ) ∀0≤ i<m
FC(x)i = 1⊕F(x)i = 1⊕ f (xi−ℓ, . . . ,xi+r) ∀0≤ i<m .
We can now show that, for a given (t,n)-AI CA it is possible to obtain other
(not necessarily distinct) (t,n)-AI by taking either its reverse or its complement.
Proposition 1. Let F : Fn2 → F
m
2 be a (t,n)-AI CA for some n,m, t ∈ N with n =
m+ r+ ℓ and r = ℓ. Then its reverse FR is also a (t,n)-AI CA.
Proof. Starting with the reverse CA, by definition FR(x) is F(xR)R. Hence, given
a set of indices I with |I| ≤ t, the reflection of the |I|-ACA F˜RI is:
F˜RI (x)i = (F˜J(x
R)R)i =
{
f (xi+r, . . . ,xi−ℓ) if i < J
xi if i ∈ J
(3)
Where J ⊆ {−ℓ, . . . ,m+ r−1} is defined as a “reverse” of the set I of indices, that
is J = {m+ r− ℓ−1− i : i ∈ I}. Notice that J ⊆ [m] in all cases only if ℓ= r. This
means that for every set I of indices for FR, the corresponding set J of indices in
F is still a valid one (i.e., a subset of [m]). Notice that since f generates a (t,n)-AI
CA and |J|= |I| ≤ t, the resulting ACA is still (t,n)-AI. 
Notice that, in general, if a (t,n)-AI CA has memory ℓ and anticipation r with
ℓ , r, its reverse might not be a (t,n)-AI CA. In fact, since center permutivity of
the local rule is not preserved, this negates a condition for asynchrony-immunity
that, by Theorem 1, is necessary for large enough values of t and n.
Proposition 2. Let F : Fn2 → F
m
2 be a (t,n)-AI CA for some n,m, t ∈ N. Then its
complement FC is also a (t,n)-AI CA.
Proof. Let y ∈ Fm2 be a configuration, I ⊆ [m] with |I| ≤ t, and let (F
C
I )
−1(y) be
the set of preimages of y under the function FCI . By definition, for each x ∈ F
n
2,
FC(x) = 1⊕F(x). Hence, the set (FCI )
−1(y) is {x : 1⊕FI(x) = y}, which is {x :
FI(x) = 1⊕ y} which corresponds to F
−1
I (1⊕ y). Since F is a (t,n)-AI CA, and all
y ranges across all elements of Fm2 (and thus 1⊕ y does the same), F
−1
I is balanced
and (FCI )
−1 is also balanced. Since this holds for every set I of cardinality at most
t, it follows that FC is also a (t,n)-AI CA, as required. 
Upper bounds on the size of the search space could be derived using techniques
from [4] w.r.t. to the set of transformations FR,FC,FRC, Id, where Id is the identity
transformation.
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n ℓ r t |Bℓ+r+1| |Cℓ+r+1|
10 1 1 2 256 16
11 1 2 3 65536 256
12 2 2 4 ≈ 4.3 ·109 65536
Table 1: CA parameters for m= 8 output bits.
4 Search of AI Rules up to 5 Variables
In order to search for asynchrony immune rules having additional cryptographic
properties, by Theorem 1 and Propositions 1 and 2 we only need to explore center-
permutive rules under the equivalence classes induced by reflection and comple-
ment.
In our experiments, we fixed the number of output bits in the CA to m = 8.
Since we are considering only center-permutive rules, we tested only the smallest
value of t satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem 1. The reason why we limited our
analysis to these particular values is twofold. First, checking for asynchrony immu-
nity is a computationally cumbersome task, since it requires to determine the output
distribution of the t-ACA for all possible choices of at most t blocked cells. Sec-
ond, the sizes of vectorial Boolean functions employed as nonlinear components in
several real-world cryptographic primitives is limited. A concrete example is given
by AES [15], which employs a S-box with 8 output bits.
Table 1 shows all CA parameters considered in our experiments from 3 to 5
input variables of the local rules, while keeping the value of output bits fixed to
m= 8. Recall that, since we need to consider only center permutive local rules, we
do not need to explore the entire Bℓ+r+1 space, but only the subset Cℓ+r+1 having
cardinality 22
ℓ+r
.
We started our investigation by performing an exhaustive search among all CA
rules with ℓ= r = 1 (that is, rules of 3 variables), which are also known in the CA
literature as elementary rules. Up to reflection and complement, and neglecting
the identity rule that is trivially AI for every length n and order t, out of the 22
3
=
256 elementary rules we found that only rule 60 is (2,10)–asynchrony immune.
However, rule 60 is not interesting from the cryptographic standpoint, since it is
linear (its ANF being x2⊕ x3).
We thus extended the search by considering all local rules of 4 and 5 input
variables, according to the values of ℓ and r reported in Table 1.
For the case of 4 variables, the search returned a total of 18 rules satisfying
(3,11)–asynchrony immunity, among which several of them were nonlinear. Ta-
ble 2 reports the Wolfram codes of the discovered rules, along with their nonlinear-
ity values and algebraic normal form. It can be observed that 12 rules out of 18 are
nonlinear, but none of them is a bent function (since the nonlinearity value in this
case would be 6).
For 5 variables, Table 3 reports the list of (4,12)-AI CA. One can see that in
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Rule Nl( f ) f (x0,x1,x2 ,x3) Rule Nl( f ) f (x0,x1,x2 ,x3)
13107 0 1⊕ x1 14028 2 x1⊕ x0x3⊕ x2x3⊕ x0x2x3
13116 4 x1⊕ x2⊕ x3⊕ x2x3 14643 2 1⊕ x1⊕ x0x3⊕ x0x2x3
13155 2 1⊕ x1⊕ x2⊕ x0x2⊕ x2x3⊕ x0x2x3 14796 2 x1⊕ x3⊕ x0x3⊕ x0x2x3
13164 2 x1⊕ x0x2⊕ x3⊕ x0x2x3 15411 4 1⊕ x1⊕ x3⊕ x2x3
13203 2 1⊕ x1⊕ x0x2⊕ x0x2x3 15420 0 x1⊕ x2
13212 2 x1⊕ x2⊕ x0x2⊕ x3⊕ x2x3⊕ x0x2x3 15555 0 1⊕ x1⊕ x2⊕ x3
13251 4 1⊕ x1⊕ x2⊕ x2x3 15564 4 x1⊕ x2x3
13260 0 x1⊕ x3 26214 0 x0⊕ x1
13875 2 1⊕ x1⊕ x3⊕ x0x3⊕ x2x3⊕ x0x2x3 26265 0 1⊕ x0⊕ x1⊕ x3
Table 2: List of (3,11)–asynchrony immune CA rules of neighborhood size 4.
this case most of the asynchrony immune functions are nonlinear, and moreover
two of them achieve the maximum nonlinearity allowed by the quadratic bound,
which in this case is 12.
5 Open Problems
There are many possible research directions for exploring asynchrony immune CA,
mainly related to generalizations and relations with other models.
From the generalization point of view, we can relax the assumption that an at-
tacker can control the updating of at most t cells on n cells CA. We can suppose
that additional “anti-tamper” measures are present and, for example, that the at-
tacker can only take control of non-consecutive cells. More in general, we can
define (F ,n)-asynchrony immune CA where F ⊆ 2[m] is a family of subsets of
{0, . . . ,m−1}. The standard (t,n)-AI CA can be recovered by taking F as the set
of all subsets of [m] with cardinality at most t. It would be interesting to understand
for what families of sets the theorems of this paper still hold. Also, what are some
families that are “plausible” from a real-world point of view? This study will also
require to explore the different methods that can be employed by an attacker to take
control of some cells and what physical limits restrict the patterns of blocked cells
that can be generated.
Another research direction is to find relations with already existing CA models
that can be used to implement AI CA. Take, for example, the Multiple Updating
Cycles CA (MUCCA) [11], where each cell has a speed 1/k for a positive k ∈ N
and a cell updates only if the current time step is a multiple of k. This means that,
at different time steps, different cells might be active. If the current time step is
not known or if it is under the attacker’s control, then a CA that is (t,n)-AI can
withstand any situation in which the number of “slow” cells (i.e., with speed less
than 1) is bounded by t. More generally, in what other models of ACA being
asynchrony immune can protect from an attacker that controls some variables (like
the time step in MUCCA)?
Subsequently, we have found that for size n = 11 there are no (11,4)-AI CA
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Rule Nl( f ) f (x1,x2 ,x3,x4,x5) Rule Nl( f ) f (x1,x2,x3 ,x4,x5)
252691440 4 x3⊕ x4⊕ x2x4⊕ x5⊕ x4x5⊕ 3031741620 8 x2⊕ x1x2⊕ x3
x2x4x5
252702960 0 x3⊕ x5 3035673780 6 x2⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x2x5⊕ x1x2x5⊕
x2x4x5⊕ x1x2x4x5
253678110 10 x1⊕ x2⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x2x4⊕ 3537031890 8 x1⊕ x1x2⊕ x3
x4x5⊕ x1x4x5⊕ x1x2x4x5
255652080 4 x3⊕ x2x5⊕ x4x5⊕ x2x4x5 3537035730 8 x1⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x4⊕ x2x4⊕
x4x5⊕ x2x4x5
264499440 4 x3⊕ x5⊕ x2x5⊕ x2x4x5 3539005680 2 x3⊕ x1x4x5⊕ x1x2x4x5
267390960 0 x3⊕ x4 4027576500 6 x2⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x2x4⊕ x1x2x4⊕
x5⊕ x2x5⊕ x1x2x5⊕ x4x5⊕
x2x4x5⊕ x1x2x4x5
267448560 8 x3⊕ x4x5 4030525680 4 x3⊕ x2x5⊕ x2x4x5
505290270 8 x1⊕ x2⊕ x1x2⊕ x3 4031508720 6 x3⊕ x5⊕ x2x5⊕ x1x2x5⊕ x4x5⊕
x2x4x5⊕ x1x2x4x5
505336350 8 x1⊕ x2⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x2x4⊕ 4038390000 2 x3⊕ x2x5⊕ x1x2x5⊕ x2x4x5⊕
x2x4x5 x1x2x4x5
509222490 4 x1⊕ x3⊕ x2x4⊕ x1x2x4 4039373040 4 x3⊕ x5⊕ x2x5⊕ x4x5⊕ x2x4x5
517136850 12 x1⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x4⊕ x2x4⊕ 4040348370 6 x1⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x1x4x5⊕ x1x2x4x5
x4x5
756994590 12 x1⊕ x2⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x2x4⊕ 4042268400 6 x3⊕ x1x4⊕ x2x4⊕ x1x2x4⊕
x4x5 x1x4x5⊕ x2x4x5⊕ x1x2x4x5
2018211960 8 x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x5⊕ x2x5⊕ 4042276080 4 x3⊕ x2x4⊕ x2x4x5
x4x5⊕ x2x4x5
2018212080 10 x3⊕ x1x2x4⊕ x5⊕ x2x5⊕ 4042310640 4 x3⊕ x4⊕ x2x4⊕ x4x5⊕ x2x4x5
x1x2x5⊕ x4x5⊕ x2x4x5⊕
x1x2x4x5
2526451350 0 x1⊕ x2⊕ x3 4042318320 2 x3⊕ x4⊕ x1x4⊕ x2x4⊕ x1x2x4⊕
x4x5⊕ x1x4x5⊕ x2x4x5⊕ x1x2x4x5
3023877300 6 x2⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x1x2x5⊕ 4042322160 0 x3
x1x2x4x5
3027809460 8 x2⊕ x1x2⊕ x3⊕ x2x5⊕
x2x4x5
Table 3: List of (4,12)–asynchrony immune CA rules of neighborhood size 5.
rules reaching maximum nonlinearity, that is, none of them is a bent function.
Hence, an interesting question would be if there exists at least one bent AI CA
rule of larger number of variables, and if it is possible to design an infinite family
of bent AI CA.
Finally, from the cryptanalysis point of view, it would be interesting to analyze
the resistance to clock-fault attacks of cryptographic primitives and ciphers based
on cellular automata, such as the stream cipher CAR30 [6], the χ S-box employed
in the Keccak sponge construction [1], or the CA-based S-boxes optimized through
Genetic Programming in [16, 13] and to verify if plugging in their design one of
the AI CA rules found here decreases their possible vulnerability.
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